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*	  Captain	  Carlson	  and	  Lieutenant	  Cronin	  are	  Coast	  Guard	  Judge	  Advocates	  stationed	  at	  the	  
Seventh	  Coast	  Guard	  District	  in	  Miami,	  Florida.	  	  	  	  The	  Seventh	  Coast	  Guard	  District	  area	  of	  
operations	  includes	  the	  waters	  off	  the	  states	  of	  South	  Carolina,	  Georgia,	  Florida,	  Puerto	  Rico,	  
the	  U.S	  Virgin	  Islands,	  and	  the	  waters	  of	  the	  Caribbean	  Sea.	  	  It	  borders	  34	  foreign	  countries	  and	  
territories,	  and	  encompasses	  an	  area	  over	  1.8	  million	  square	  miles.	  	  This	  paper	  summarizes	  
Captain	  Carlson’s	  comments	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Miami	  School	  of	  Law	  National	  Security	  &	  
Armed	  Conflict	  Law	  Review	  symposium,	  “Illicit	  Trafficking	  and	  National	  Security,”	  on	  February	  
28,	  2014.	  	  The	  opinions	  herein	  are	  the	  authors’	  alone,	  and	  do	  not	  necessarily	  reflect	  the	  views	  
of	  the	  United	  States	  Coast	  Guard	  or	  the	  Commandant	  of	  the	  Coast	  Guard.	  




Transnational	   organized	   crime	   prevails	   in	   many	   forms.	   	   The	   White	  
House	   prioritizes	   six	   illicit	   threat	   streams	   in	   the	   Strategy	   to	   Combat	  
Transnational	   Organized	   Crime	   (TOC);1	   with	   little	   effort	   one	   can	   conceive	  
twenty	  or	   so	   total.	   	  However,	   of	   all	   these	   illicit	   commerce	   streams,	   the	   illicit	  
drug	   threat	   has	   dominated	   the	   Western	   Hemisphere	   TOC	   and	   security	  
conversation	   since	   the	   late	   1980s,	   and	   cocaine	  more	   than	   any	   drug.	   	   In	   our	  
current	  capacities,	  we	  assist	  our	  clients	  with	  the	  Coast	  Guard	  law	  enforcement	  
mission,	  which	  most	  visibly	   involves	   the	   interdiction	  of	   illicit	  drugs	  on	  waters	  
seaward	  of	  other	  nations’	   territorial	  seas.	   	   Interdiction	   is	  a	  component	  of	   the	  
supply-­‐side	  equation	  of	  countering	   illicit	  drug	  flows.	   	  We	  will	   touch	  briefly	  on	  
the	  elements	  of	  supply	  reduction,	  as	  opposed	  to	  demand	  reduction.2	  	  We	  will	  
then	  briefly	  outline	  how	  the	  Coast	  Guard,	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  can	  
haul	   foreign	  nationals	   interdicted	  on	   the	  high	   seas,	   and	  at	   times	   from	  within	  
another	  nation’s	  territorial	  sea,	   into	  United	  States’	  courts,	  perhaps	  thousands	  
of	   miles	   distant.	   	   We	   then	   will	   offer	   some	   considerations	   for	   interagency	  
improvement	  of	  the	  counterdrug	  effort.	  
Cocaine	  has	  been	  a	  scourge	  to	  society	  and	  the	  focus	  of	  multiple	  nations’	  
law	  enforcement	  efforts	   since	   the	  1980s.	   	  Due	   to	   its	  prominence	   in	  affecting	  
United	  States’,	   as	  well	  as	  myriad	   transit	  nations’,	   civil	   society,	   it	   in	  effect	  has	  
been	   a	   proxy	   for	   the	   efforts	   to	   combat	   transnational	   organized	   crime	   (TOC)	  
throughout	   the	   Western	   Hemisphere.	   	   The	   United	   States	   has	   multi-­‐faceted	  
programs	  to	  assist	  partner	  nations	  with	  the	  problem	  of	   illicit	  drugs’	  direct,	  or	  
second-­‐	   or	   third-­‐order,	   affects.	   	   Illustrative	   assistance	   programs	   include	   Plan	  
Colombia,	   so-­‐called	   section	  1004	  and	  1033	  assistance,3	   the	  Central	  American	  
Regional	   Security	   Initiative	   (CARSI),4	   the	   Caribbean	   Basin	   Security	   Initiative	  
                                                
1	  Specifically,	  the	  crime-­‐terror	  nexus	  (i.e.	  use	  of	  organized	  crime	  to	  fund	  terror	  and	  insurgent	  
groups),	  drug	  trafficking,	  trafficking	  in	  persons,	  weapons	  trafficking,	  intellectual	  property	  theft,	  
and	  cybercrime.	  	  White	  House,	  National	  Security	  Council,	  Strategy	  to	  Combat	  Transnational	  
Organized	  Crime	  at	  6-­‐7	  (Jul.	  2011),	  available	  at	  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/2011-­‐strategy-­‐combat-­‐
transnational-­‐organized-­‐crime.pdf.	  	  The	  strategy	  also	  addresses	  enabling	  paths	  to	  fighting	  TOC.	  	  	  
2	  We	  do	  not	  say	  this	  to	  advocate	  one	  approach	  over	  another:	  both	  elements	  are	  required	  for	  a	  
balanced	  policy	  to	  counter	  the	  scourge	  of	  illegal	  drugs.	  
3	  See	  National	  Defense	  Authorization	  Act	  (NDAA)	  of	  2001,	  Pub.	  L.	  No.	  101-­‐510,	  §	  1004,	  115	  
Stat.	  1012	  (2001)	  (as	  amended	  through	  the	  year	  2011);	  See	  also	  NDAA	  of	  1998,	  L.	  No.	  105-­‐85,	  §	  
1033,	  111	  Stat.	  1629	  (1997)	  (as	  amended	  through	  the	  year	  2011).	  
4	  See	  Consolidated	  Appropriations	  Act	  of	  2010,	  H.R.	  3288,	  11th	  Cong.	  §	  7045	  (2010)	  (as	  
codified	  in	  Consolidated	  Appropriations	  Act	  of	  2010,	  Pub.	  L.	  No.	  111-­‐117,	  123	  Stat.	  3034	  
(2010).	  Formerly	  part	  of	  the	  Merida	  Initiative,	  CARSI	  was	  split	  from	  Merida	  in	  2010,	  available	  at	  
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-­‐111hr3288enr/pdf/BILLS-­‐111hr3288enr.pdf.	  	  The	  act	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  U.	  MIAMI	  NAT’L	  SECURITY	  &	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  L.	  REV.	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  Ed.	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  IV	  
 
45	  
(CBSI),5	   the	   Merida	   Initiative,6	   and	   Beyond	   Merida	   Initiative.7	   	   These	   are	  
administered	  alternately	  by	  the	  Department	  of	  State,	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  
and	  the	  United	  States	  Agency	  for	  International	  Development	  (USAID).8	  
	   The	   cocaine	   business	  model	   changed	   in	   response	   to	   the	  United	   States’	  
and	   Colombia’s	   efforts.	   	   Gone	   are	   the	   days	   when	   cartels	   managed	   vertical	  
cocaine	   monopolies,	   controlling	   production	   to	   distribution.	   	   Ownership	   of	   a	  
cocaine	   load	   commonly	   changes	   at	   the	  water’s	   edge	   of	   South	   America,	  with	  
smaller	   dispersed	   transporter-­‐contractors	   operating	   at	   various	   Mexican	  
organizations’	  orders,	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  single	  master.9	  	  Additionally,	  small-­‐scale	  
producers	   are	   firmly	   ensconced	   throughout	   Central	   America,	   Brazil,	   and	  
Paraguay,10	   expanding	   beyond	   the	   source	   countries	   of	   Colombia,	   Peru,	   and	  
Bolivia.	   	   In	   effect,	   when	   the	   United	   States	   and	   Colombia	   began	   gaining	  
momentum	  against	  major	  cocaine	  producers	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  early	  2000s,	  the	  
organized	  crime	  shifted	  to	  Mexico.	  	  When	  the	  Mexican	  government	  increased	  
the	   pressure	   in	   the	   mid-­‐2000s,	   with	   assistance	   from	   the	  Merida	   Initiative,11	  
Mexican	   groups	   expanded	   into	   Central	   America,	   primarily	   Honduras	   and	  
Guatemala.	  	  With	  increasing	  Mexican	  Government	  pressure,	  organized	  crime	  is	  
shifting	  further	  into	  Central	  America.12	   	   	  Shipping	  their	   illicit	  cargo	  northward,	  
                                                                                                                             
placed	  assistance	  to	  Central	  America	  into	  a	  new	  Central	  America	  Regional	  Security	  Initiative	  
(CARSI),	  splitting	  Central	  America	  from	  the	  Mérida	  Initiative.	  	  
5	  Id.	  at	  §	  7045(c).	  
6	  U.S.	  DEP’T	  OF	  STATE,	  BUREAU	  OF	  INT’L	  NARCOTICS	  AND	  LAW	  ENFORCEMENT	  AFFAIRS,	  MERIDA	  INITIATIVe	  
(2009),	  available	  at	  	  http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/fs/122397.htm.	  
7	  U.S.	  DEP’T	  OF	  STATE,	  JOINT	  STATEMENT	  OF	  THE	  MERIDA	  INITIATIVE	  HIGH-­‐LEVEL	  CONSULTATIVE	  GROUP	  ON	  
BILATERAL	  COOPERATION	  AGAINST	  TRANSNATIONAL	  ORGANIZED	  CRIME	  (2010),	  available	  at	  
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/03/139196.htm.	  
8	  CLARE	  R.	  SEELKE,	  LIANA	  S.	  WYLER,	  JUNE	  S.	  BEITTLE,	  MARK	  P.	  SULLIVAN,	  CONG.	  RESEARCH	  SERV.,	  R41215,	  
LATIN	  AMERICA	  AND	  THE	  CARIBBEAN,	  ILLICIT	  DRUG	  TRAFFICKING	  AND	  U.S.	  COUNTERDRUG	  PROGRAMS	  9	  
(2011),	  available	  at	  http://justf.org/files/primarydocs/R41215.pdf.	  	  	  
9	  See	  generally	  JUAN	  CARLOS	  GARZON	  ET	  AL.,	  THE	  CRIMINAL	  DIASPORA:	  THE	  SPREAD	  OF	  TRANSNATIONAL	  
ORGANIZED	  CRIME	  AND	  HOW	  TO	  CONTAIN	  ITS	  EXPANSION	  (2013),	  available	  at	  
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/CriminalDiaspora;	  See	  also	  U.S	  Department	  of	  the	  
Treasury,	  Treasury	  Designates	  Honduran	  Drug	  Traffickers:	  Action	  Targets	  Link	  to	  Colombian	  
and	  Mexican	  Narcotics	  Operations,	  DEP’T	  OF	  TREASURY,	  Apr.	  9,	  2013,	  available	  at	  
http://www.treasury.gov/press-­‐center/press-­‐releases/Pages/jl1888.aspx.	  	  	  
10	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  	  Michael	  Lohmuller,	  Honduras	  Cocaine	  Lab	  Points	  to	  Production	  Migration,	  INSIGHT	  
CRIME,	  Feb.	  11,	  2014,	  http://www.insightcrime.org/news-­‐briefs/honduras-­‐cocaine-­‐lab-­‐points-­‐
to-­‐production-­‐migration,	  Charles	  Parkinson,	  Paraguay	  Cocaine	  Lab	  Bust	  Latest	  Example	  of	  
Criminal	  Migration,	  INSIGHT	  CRIME,	  Feb.	  12,	  2014,	  http://www.insightcrime.org/news-­‐
briefs/paraguay-­‐cocaine-­‐lab-­‐bust-­‐latest-­‐example-­‐of-­‐criminal-­‐migration.	  
11	  William	  R.	  Brownfield,	  Asst.	  Sect’y	  of	  State,	  Testimony	  before	  the	  Subcommittee	  on	  Western	  
Hemisphere,	  Peace	  Corps,	  and	  Global	  Narcotics	  Affairs,	  Senate	  Foreign	  Relations	  Committee,	  
(Dec.	  15,	  2011),	  available	  at	  http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/rm/178886.htm.	  
12	  Id.	  
2013]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Transnational	  Organized	  Crime	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transportation	   specialists	  operating	   at	   the	  orders	  of	  Mexican	   cartels	   ship	   the	  
illicit	   cargo	   to	   the	   Central	   American	   Isthmus,	  where	   they	  make	   their	  way	   by	  
land	   to	   the	   United	   States.	   	   Middle	   men	   are	   paid	   not	   with	   cash,	   but	   with	  
cocaine,	  creating	  a	  supply	  and	  competition	  for	   local	  markets,	  which	  leaves	  an	  
exhaust	   of	   instability,13	   corruption,14	   and	   violence15	   through	   Central	   America	  
and	   Mexico.	   	   While	   the	   northbound	   smuggling	   vectors	   are	   populated	   by	  
cocaine	  and	  methamphetamines,	  they	  are	  populated	  southbound	  by	  bulk	  cash	  
and	  weapons.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   One	  of	  the	  few	  weak	  links	  in	  the	  TOC	  model	  is	  the	  necessity	  for	  the	  large	  
majority	  of	  cocaine	  to	  transit	  the	  maritime	  domain	  during	  at	   least	  part	  of	  the	  
supply	   chain	  northward.16	   	   Fortunately	   the	  United	   States	   has	   implemented	   a	  
sound	   legal	   regime	   to	  address	   the	   threat	   in	   the	  maritime	  domain,	   leveraging	  
international	  and	  domestic	  law,	  as	  well	  as	  partnerships	  with	  allied	  and	  partner	  
nations.	  	  	  
	   The	  2013	  National	  Drug	  Control	   Strategy	  highlights	   continuing	   focus	  on	  
dismantling	   international	   drug	   trafficking	   organizations,	   disrupting	   the	  
maritime	   transport	   of	   drugs	   from	   source	   countries,	   and	   “[constructing]	  
criminal	   cases,	   [capturing]	   major	   kingpins,	   and	   [seizing]	   drugs	   and	   the	   illicit	  
proceeds	   of	   crime.”17	   	   In	   the	  maritime	   domain,	   the	   task	   of	   finding	   narcotics	  
traffickers	  and	  then	  bringing	  them	  to	  the	  district	  courts	  of	  the	  United	  States	  for	  
prosecution	   requires	   two	   capabilities:	   	   (1)	   the	   authority	   to	   board	   vessels	  
                                                
13	  This	  assertion	  may	  admittedly	  be	  reversed.	  	  It	  may	  be	  that	  systemic	  instability	  provides	  a	  
path	  of	  least	  resistance	  in	  which	  transnational	  criminal	  organizations	  can	  take	  advantage	  of.	  	  
See	  Jeremy	  McDermott,	  The	  Zetas	  Set	  up	  Shop	  in	  Honduras,	  INSIGHT	  CRIME,	  Feb.	  4,	  2013,	  
http://www.insightcrime.org/news-­‐analysis/zetas-­‐set-­‐up-­‐in-­‐honduras.	  
14	  E.g.,	  Associated	  Press,	  Honduran	  Official:	  Authorities	  are	  Helping	  Country’s	  Biggest	  Drug	  
Cartel,	  FOX	  NEWS,	  Oct.	  10,	  2013,	  http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/10/10/honduran-­‐
official-­‐authorities-­‐are-­‐helping-­‐country-­‐biggest-­‐drug-­‐cartel,	  Goeffrey	  Ramsey,	  CICIG	  Names	  18	  
‘Judges	  of	  Impunity’	  in	  Guatemala,	  INSIGHT	  CRIME,	  Dec.	  4,	  2012,	  
http://www.insightcrime.org/news-­‐analysis/cicig-­‐names-­‐18-­‐judges-­‐of-­‐impunity-­‐in-­‐guatemala.	  
15	  See	  Patrick	  Radden	  Keefe,	  Cocaine	  Incorporated:	  How	  a	  Mexican	  Drug	  Cartel	  Makes	  its	  
Billions,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  June	  15,	  2012,	  http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/magazine/how-­‐a-­‐
mexican-­‐drug-­‐cartel-­‐makes-­‐its-­‐billions.html.	  Some	  quantify	  the	  impact	  of	  efforts	  against	  illicit	  
drugs	  in	  Mexico	  as	  more	  than	  50,000	  persons	  killed	  since	  2006.	  For	  a	  micro-­‐view	  of	  the	  
violence	  See	  also	  Stephen	  S.	  Dudley,	  The	  Zetas	  in	  Guatemala,	  Part	  I:	  The	  Incursion,	  INSIGHT	  
CRIME,	  Sep.	  7,	  2011,	  http://www.insightcrime.org/the-­‐zetas-­‐in-­‐guatemala/part-­‐1-­‐the-­‐incursion,	  	  
Óscar	  F.	  Herrera,	  Matan	  a	  Obdulio	  Solórzano	  y	  a	  un	  guardaespaldas,	  ELPERIODICO,	  Jul.	  9,	  2010,	  
available	  at	  	  http://www.elperiodico.com.gt/es/20100709/pais/163103.	  
16	  See	  Border	  Sec.	  Threats	  to	  the	  Homeland:	  DHS'	  Response	  to	  Innovative	  	  
Tactics	  and	  Techniques,	  112th	  Cong.	  (2012)	  (statement	  of	  Charles	  D.	  Michel,	  Dir.	  Joint	  
Interagency	  Task	  Force-­‐South),	  available	  at	  http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-­‐
112hhrg79505/html/CHRG-­‐112hhrg79505.htm.	  
17	  Office	  of	  National	  Drug	  Control	  Policy,	  2013	  National	  Drug	  Control	  Strategy,	  
http://www.whitehouse.gov//sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-­‐and-­‐research/ndcs_2013.pdf.	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47	  
suspected	  of	   illegal	   narcotics	   trafficking	   and	   (2)	   a	   domestic	   legal	   regime	   that	  
criminalizes	  confirmed	  instances	  of	  that	  conduct.	  
II. THE	  ABILITY	  TO	  BOARD	  VESSELS	  SUSPECTED	  OF	  ILLEGAL	  	  
	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  NARCOTICS	  TRAFFICKING	  
	   Assets	   of	   the	   United	   States	   Coast	   Guard	   are	   constantly	   patrolling	   the	  
Western	   Hemisphere’s	   major	   narcotics	   trafficking	   vectors	   with	   the	   intent	   of	  
locating	  and	  then	  boarding	  those	  vessels	  suspected	  of	   illicit	  drug	  trafficking.18	  	  
To	  that	  end,	  the	  Coast	  Guard	  relies	  upon	  a	  robust	  interagency	  infrastructure,	  to	  
include	  the	  Joint	  Interagency	  Task	  Force	  South	  and	  Department	  of	  Defense	  and	  
Homeland	  Security	  assets	  assigned	  to	  detection	  and	  monitoring	  duties.19	   	  The	  
Coast	   Guard	   also	   relies	   on	   a	   range	   of	   international	   and	   domestic	   authorities	  
that	   permit	   these	   assets	   to	   patrol	   the	  waters	   of	   the	   United	   States,	   the	   high	  
seas,	   and	   those	   of	   foreign	   nations,	   with	   the	   capacity	   to	   board	   U.S.	   flagged	  
vessels	  as	  well	  as	  those	  of	  foreign	  nations.	  	  	  
A. Vessels	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Vessels	  Located	  within	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  United	  States	  Waters	  
	   The	   Coast	   Guard’s	   principal	   law	   enforcement	   authority	   derives	   from	  
section	  89(a)	  of	  Title	  14	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Code,	  which	  authorizes	  the	  Coast	  
Guard	   to	   stop	   and	   board	   any	   vessel	   subject	   to	   United	   States	   jurisdiction.	  	  
Section	  89(a)	  reads:	  
	  “The	  Coast	  Guard	  may	  make	   inquiries,	  examinations,	   inspections,	  searches,	  
seizures,	   and	  arrests	  upon	   the	  high	   seas	  and	  waters	  over	  which	   the	  United	  
States	   has	   jurisdiction,	   for	   the	   prevention,	   detection,	   and	   suppression	   of	  
violations	   of	   laws	   of	   the	  United	   States.	   	   For	   such	   purposes,	   commissioned,	  
warrant,	  and	  petty	  officers	  may	  at	  any	  time	  go	  on	  board	  of	  any	  vessel	  subject	  
to	  the	  jurisdiction,	  or	  to	  the	  operations	  of	  any	  law,	  of	  the	  United	  States…”20	  
	   Pursuant	   to	   customary	   international	   law,	   vessels	   of	   the	   United	   States,	  
which	   are	   comprised	   for	   the	   most	   part	   by	   those	   documented	   pursuant	   to	  
United	  States	  law21	  or	  certificated	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  laws	  of	  one	  of	  the	  50	  
                                                
18	  Id.	  
19	  See	  10	  U.S.C.A.	  §	  124	  (2014).	  The	  Department	  of	  Defense	  is	  lead	  agency	  for	  detection	  and	  
monitoring	  of	  maritime	  and	  aerial	  transit	  of	  illicit	  drugs	  “in	  support	  of	  the	  counter-­‐drug	  
activities	  of	  Federal,	  State,	  local,	  and	  foreign	  law	  enforcement	  agencies”	  (emphasis	  added).	  
20	  14	  U.S.C.A.	  §	  89(a)	  (2013).	  
21	  See	  46	  U.S.C.A.	  §§	  12101-­‐06	  (2013)	  (providing	  U.S.	  documentation	  requirements).	  
2013]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Transnational	  Organized	  Crime	  in	  the	  Maritime	  Domain	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states,22	  are	  subject	  to	  the	  “exclusive	  jurisdiction”	  of	  the	  United	  States.23	  	  Thus,	  
through	   section	   89(a)’s	   authority	   to	   board	   “any	   vessel	   subject	   to	   the	  
jurisdiction…	  of	  the	  United	  States,”	  vessels	  of	  the	  United	  States	  are	  subject	  to	  
boarding	  by	  any	  Coast	  Guard	  asset,	  wherever	  located.	  
	   Based	  on	  the	  well-­‐established	  principles	  of	  customary	  international	   law,	  
vessels	   of	   foreign	   nations	   located	   within	   the	   territorial	   seas	   of	   the	   United	  
States,	   i.e.	   the	   water	   stretching	   from	   the	   baseline24	   out	   to	   twelve	   nautical	  
miles25,	  are	  subject	   to	  United	  States	   jurisdiction	  and	  thus,	   to	  boarding	  by	  the	  
Coast	   Guard,	   unless	   engaged	   in	   a	   recognized	   high	   seas	   freedom,	   such	   as	  
innocent	  passage.26	  	  Additionally,	  those	  located	  within	  the	  contiguous	  zone	  of	  
the	  United	  States,	  i.e.	  the	  water	  stretching	  from	  the	  12	  nautical	  mile	  mark	  out	  
to	   the	   24	   nautical	   mile	  mark27,	   are	   subject	   to	   the	   jurisdiction	   of	   the	   United	  
States,	  when	  infringing	  on	  the	  customs,	  fiscal,	   immigration	  or	  sanitary	  laws	  of	  
the	  United	  States.28	  
B. Vessels	  of	  Foreign	  Nations	  
	   Just	   as	   U.S.	   flagged	   vessels	   fall	   within	   the	   exclusive	   jurisdiction	   of	   the	  
United	  States,	  vessels	  of	  foreign	  nations	  fall	  within	  the	  exclusive	  jurisdiction	  of	  
the	  nations	  in	  which	  they	  are	  registered.29	   	  Accordingly,	  the	  Coast	  Guard	  may	  
not	   board,	   and	   the	   United	   States	  may	   not	   exercise	   jurisdiction,	   over	   foreign	  
flagged	  vessels,	  except	  in	  instances	  in	  which	  the	  foreign	  nation	  in	  question	  has	  
consented.	  	  In	  the	  context	  of	  illicit	  maritime	  drug	  trafficking,	  the	  international	  
community	   has	   long	   recognized	   the	   need	   to	   effectuate	   this	   consent	   through	  
cooperation	   and	   formal	   international	   agreement.	   	   The	  United	   States,	   and	   86	  
other	  nations,	  ratified	  the	  1988	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  against	  Illicit	  Traffic	  
in	  Narcotic	  Drugs	   and	   Psychotropic	   Substances	   (“1988	  Convention”),	   thereby	  
formally	  acknowledging	  their	  collective	  responsibility	   in	  stemming	  the	  flow	  of	  
                                                
22	  See	  46	  U.S.C.A	  s.12302	  (2013);	  See	  also	  United	  States	  v.	  Behety,	  32	  F.3d	  503,	  511-­‐12	  (11th	  
Cir.	  1994).	  
23	  See	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  (hereinafter	  LOS),	  art.	  92,	  Sep.	  12,	  
1982	  (“Ships	  shall	  sail	  under	  the	  flag	  of	  one	  State	  only	  and,	  save	  in	  exceptional	  cases	  expressly	  
provided	  for	  in	  international	  treaties	  or	  in	  this	  Convention,	  shall	  be	  subject	  to	  its	  exclusive	  
jurisdiction	  on	  the	  high	  seas.	  A	  ship	  may	  not	  change	  its	  flag	  during	  a	  voyage	  or	  while	  in	  a	  port	  
of	  call,	  save	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  real	  transfer	  of	  ownership	  or	  change	  of	  registry.”),	  available	  at	  
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.	  
24	  Id.	  at	  art.	  6-­‐13.	  
25	  Id.	  at	  art.	  3.	  
26	  Id.	  at	  art.	  7;	  See	  also	  United	  States	  v.	  Marino-­‐Garcia,	  679	  F.2d	  1373,	  1380	  (11th	  Cir.	  1982).	  
27	  LOS,	  supra	  note	  23,	  at	  art.	  33.	  
28	  Id.;	  See	  also	  United	  States	  v.	  Best,	  304	  F.3d	  308,	  311-­‐16	  (3rd	  Cir.	  2002)	  
29	  LOS,	  supra	  note	  23,	  at	  art.	  92	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international	  drugs,	  and	  pledging	  “to	  co-­‐operate	  to	  the	  fullest	  extent	  possible	  
to	  suppress	  illicit	  traffic	  by	  sea.”30	  	  Under	  the	  1988	  Convention,	  each	  party	  may	  
“…notify	   [other	   parties],	   request	   confirmation	   of	   registry	   and,	   if	   confirmed,	  
request	   authorization	   from	   [those	   parties]	   to	   take	   appropriate	   measures…”	  
whenever	   a	   vessel	   of	   another	   party	   is	   encountered	   and	   suspected	   of	   illicit	  
trafficking;	  “…[authorize	  a	  requesting	  party]	  to,	  inter	  alia:	  (a)	  Board	  the	  vessel;	  
(b)	   Search	   the	   vessel;	   (c)	   If	   evidence	   of	   involvement	   in	   illicit	   traffic	   is	   found,	  
take	   appropriate	   action	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   vessel,	   persons	   and	   cargo	   on	  
board.”;	   and	   finally	   to	   “…consider	   entering	   into	   bilateral	   or	   regional	  
agreements	  or	  arrangements	  to	  carry	  out…”	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  agreement.31	  
	   To	   partially	   effectuate	   the	   1988	   Convention,	   Congress	   authorized	   the	  
President	   to	   “to	   conclude	   agreements,	   including	   reciprocal	   maritime	  
agreements,	   with	   other	   countries	   to	   facilitate	   control	   of	   the	   production,	  
processing,	   transportation,	   and	   distribution	   of	   narcotics	   analgesics,	   including	  
opium	   and	   its	   derivatives,	   other	   narcotic	   and	   psychotropic	   drugs,	   and	   other	  
controlled	  substances.”32	   	  The	  State	  Department,	   through	  and	  with	  the	  Coast	  
Guard,	  has	   in	  turn	  negotiated	  and	  concluded	  bilateral	  agreements	  with	  many	  
of	   the	   1988	   Convention’s	   signatories.	   	   These	   bilateral	   agreements	   contain,	  
among	  other	  things,	  the	  frameworks	  by	  which	  the	  United	  States	  may	  and	  does:	  
board	  foreign	  flagged	  vessels	  suspected	  of	  illicit	  trafficking;	  enter	  the	  territorial	  
seas	  of	  foreign	  nations	  in	  order	  to	  board	  vessels	  suspected	  of	  illicit	  trafficking;	  
and	   request	   waivers	   of	   jurisdiction	   to	   try	   suspected	   drug	   smugglers	   in	   the	  
United	   States	   courts.33	   	   With	   respect	   to	   vessels	   suspected	   of	   illegal	   drug	  
trafficking,	  these	  agreements	  and	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  1988	  Convention	  have	  
facilitated	   an	   international	   regime	   in	   which	   partner	   nations	   may	   routinely	  
overcome	   the	   strong	   customary	   international	   legal	   presumption	   of	   exclusive	  








                                                
30	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  Against	  Illicit	  Traffic	  in	  Narcotic	  Drugs	  and	  Psychotropic	  
Substances	  (hereinafter	  U.N.	  Drug	  Convention),	  U.N.	  Doc.	  E/Conf.	  82/16,	  reprinted	  in	  28	  I.L.M.	  
493	  (1988),	  art.	  17.	  
31	  Id.	  
32	  22	  U.S.C.A.	  §	  2291	  (2012).	  
33	  See	  United	  States	  v.	  Perlaza,	  439	  F.3d	  1149,	  1168	  (9th	  Cir.	  2006)	  (explaining	  jurisdiction	  
through	  MDLEA	  via	  a	  bilateral	  agreement).	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C. Vessels	  Without	  Nationality,	  and	  Vessels	  Assimilated	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Without	  Nationality	  
	   In	   addition	   to	   U.S.	   and	   foreign	   flagged	   vessels,	   there	   is	   an	   additional	  
category	   of	   vessels	   that	   is	   of	   critical	   importance	   to	   understanding	   the	   Coast	  
Guard’s	   overall	   ability	   to	   board,	   and	   ultimately	   stop	   maritime	   narcotics	  
trafficking.	  	  As	  previously	  noted,	  vessels	  “shall	  sail	  under	  the	  flag	  of	  one	  State	  
only,”	  under	   international	   law.34	   	  Vessels	   that	  choose	  not	   to	  claim	  the	   flag	  of	  
any	  nation,	  and	  thus,	  sail	  under	  the	  flag	  of	  no	  nation,	  however,	  are	  considered	  
“stateless”	   vessels,	   or	   vessels	   “without	   nationality.”35	   	   Such	   stateless	   vessels	  
subject	  themselves	  to	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  every	  nation	  “solely	  as	  a	  consequence	  
of	   the	   vessel's	   status	   as	   stateless.”36	   	   Vessels	   are	   also	   considered	   to	   be	  
“without	   nationality”	   when	   they	   claim	   the	   nationality	   of	   a	   nation	   and	   that	  
nation	  subsequently	  denies	  that	  claim.37	  
	   Because	  stateless	  vessels	  are	  subject	   to	   the	   law	  of	  any	  nation,	   they	  are	  
subject	   to	   United	   States	   law,	   and	   may	   be	   boarded	   by	   the	   Coast	   Guard,	  
wherever	   located,	   provided	   they	   are	   seaward	   of	   any	   nation’s	   territorial	   sea.	  	  
The	   Coast	   Guard	   derives	   the	   right	   to	   physically	   board	   stateless	   vessels	   using	  
the	  customary	  principle	  of	  “right	  of	  visit.”38	  	  Under	  Article	  110	  of	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  
Sea	  Convention,	  a	  warship	  which	  encounters	  on	  the	  high	  seas	  a	  foreign	  ship…	  
is	  not	   justified	   in	  boarding	   it	  unless	  there	   is	  reasonable	  ground	  for	  suspecting	  
that,	   “the	   ship	   is	   without	   nationality;	   or	   ...though	   flying	   a	   foreign	   flag	   or	  
refusing	  to	  show	   its	   flag,	   the	  ship	   is,	   in	   reality,	  of	   the	  same	  nationality	  as	   the	  
warship.”	  39	  	  When	  a	  Coast	  Guard	  vessel	  encounters	  a	  vessel	  on	  the	  high	  seas	  
and	  develops	  such	  suspicions,	  it	  “…may	  proceed	  to	  verify	  the	  ship's	  right	  to	  fly	  
its	   flag.	   	   To	   this	  end,	   it	  may	   send	  a	  boat…	   to	   the	   suspected	   ship.	   If	   suspicion	  
remains	  after	  the	  documents	  have	  been	  checked,	   it	  may	  proceed	  to	  a	  further	  
examination	   on	   board	   the	   ship.”40	   	   These	   “right	   of	   visit”	   boardings	   are	  
frequently	   done	   on	   “go-­‐fasts,”	   small,	   open	   hulled	   and	   high-­‐powered	   vessels	  
that	  are	  oft	  used	  for	  illicit	  drug	  smuggling.41	  	  Because	  their	  primary	  purpose	  is	  
drug	  smuggling,	  their	  owners	  typically	  do	  not	  register	  them	  in	  any	  nation.	  	  As	  a	  
result,	  they	  become	  subject	  to	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  or	  to	  any	  
nation	  for	  that	  matter,	  and	  may	  be	  boarded	  by	  the	  Coast	  Guard.	  
                                                
34	  LOS,	  supra	  note	  23,	  at	  art.	  92.	  
35	  United	  States	  v.	  Marino-­‐Garcia,	  679	  F.2d	  1373,	  1382-­‐83	  (11th	  Cir.	  1982).	  
36	  	  Id.	  
37	  LOS,	  supra	  note	  23,	  at	  art.	  92;	  See,	  e.g.	  United	  States	  v.	  Bravo,	  489	  F.3d	  1,	  6	  (1st	  Cir.	  2007).	  
38	  LOS,	  supra	  note	  23,	  at	  art.	  110.	  
39	  Id.	  
40	  Id.	  
41	  See,	  e.g.	  United	  States	  v.	  Tinoco,	  304	  F.3d	  1088	  (11th	  Cir.	  2002).	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III. DOMESTIC	  LEGAL	  REGIME	  
	   The	  previous	   section	   reviewed	   the	  principle	   authorities	   by	  which	  Coast	  
Guard	  assets	  board	  and	  search	  foreign	  and	  U.S.	  vessels	  alike,	  and	  also	  conduct	  
boardings	  in	  the	  waters	  of	  the	  United	  States	  as	  well	  as	  foreign	  nations.	   	  Once	  
aboard,	  boarding	  teams	  search	  for	  evidence	  of	  violations	  of	  the	  Maritime	  Drug	  
Law	  Enforcement	  Act	   (“MDLEA”).42	   	  The	  MDLEA	  constitutes	   the	  principal	   tool	  
by	  which	   the	  United	  States,	   frequently	   through	   the	  Coast	  Guard,	  brings	   illicit	  
narcotics	   traffickers	   to	   justice	   in	   the	   United	   States’	   courts.	   	   The	   MDLEA	  
represents	   the	   fulfillment	   of	   the	   commitment	  made	   by	   the	   United	   States	   in	  
signing	   the	   1988	   Convention	   to	   adopt	   both	   domestic	   legislation	   that	  
criminalizes	   the	   transport	   of	   illicit	   traffic	   by	   sea	   and	   sufficient	   measures	   to	  
establish	  jurisdiction	  over	  the	  vessels	  on	  which	  the	  crimes	  have	  occurred.43	  	  	  
A. Maritime	  Drug	  Law	  Enforcement	  Act	  
	   The	  Maritime	  Drug	  Law	  Enforcement	  Act	  (“MDLEA”)	  is	  the	  United	  States’	  
principal	   domestic	   statute	   for	   prosecuting	   at-­‐sea	   narcotics	   trafficking.44	  	  
Through	   the	   MDLEA,	   the	   United	   States	   made	   it	   unlawful	   to	   “knowingly	   or	  
intentionally	  manufacture	  or	  distribute,	  or	  possess	  with	  intent	  to	  manufacture	  
or	   distribute,	   a	   controlled	   substance…”45.	   	   Intentionally	   broad,	   the	   statute	  
explicitly	   applies	   extraterritorially	   and	   permits	   the	   prosecution	   of	   any	  
individuals	   engaging	   in	   its	   prohibited	   activities	   aboard	   “(1)	   a	   vessel	   of	   the	  
United	  States	  or	  a	  vessel	  subject	  to	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  United	  States;	  or	  (2)	  
any	  vessel	  if	  the	  individual	  is	  a	  citizen	  of	  the	  United	  States	  or	  a	  resident	  alien	  of	  
the	  United	  States.”	  	  The	  MDLEA's	  jurisdiction	  determination	  is	  explicitly	  “not	  an	  
element	  of	  an	  offense,”	  and	  “[j]urisdictional	   issues	  arising	  under	  [the	  MDLEA]	  
are	  preliminary	  questions	  of	  law	  to	  be	  determined	  solely	  by	  the	  trial	  judge.”46	  	  
The	  MDLEA’s	  definitions	  of	  “vessels	  of	  the	  United	  States”	  and	  “vessels	  
subject	   to	   the	   jurisdiction	   of	   the	   United	   States”	   are	   founded	   on	   the	  
international	  principles	  described	  above.	   	   In	  using	   these	  definitions,	  Congress	  
                                                
42	  46	  U.S.C.A.	  §	  70501	  (2013).	  	  The	  context	  here	  matters:	  the	  authors	  are	  talking	  about	  
boardings	  in	  known	  drug	  smuggling	  vectors	  far	  from	  United	  States’	  shores,	  so	  omit	  the	  safety	  
inspection	  and	  administrative	  phases	  of	  a	  typical	  boarding.	  	  See	  also	  14	  U.S.C.A.	  §	  89(a)	  (	  2013).	  
43	  U.N.	  Drug	  Convention,	  supra	  note	  30,	  at	  art.	  3,	  4.	  
44	  Other	  statutes	  criminalize	  various	  aspects	  of	  maritime	  narcotics	  smuggling,	  including	  the	  
Drug	  Trafficking	  Vessel	  Interdiction	  Act,	  18	  U.S.C.A.	  §	  2285	  (2013).	  	  The	  DTVIA	  makes	  it	  a	  felony	  
to	  operate	  or	  embark	  in	  a	  stateless	  self-­‐propelled	  semi-­‐submersible	  (SPSS)	  or	  fully	  submersible	  
vessel	  seaward	  of	  any	  State’s	  territorial	  seas.	  	  
45	  46	  U.S.C.A.	  s.	  70503	  (2013).	  
46	  See	  United	  States	  v.	  Mitchell-­‐Hunter,	  663	  F.3d	  45,	  51	  (1st	  Cir.	  2011)	  (citing	  46	  U.S.C.A.	  §	  
70504(a)	  (2013)).	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manifested	   its	   intent	   to	  push	  the	  extraterritorial	  application	  of	   the	  MDLEA	  to	  
the	   limits	  of	   the	  United	  States’	   jurisdiction	  with	   respect	   to	  vessels	  outside	  of	  
United	   States	   waters.47	   	   Subsequently,	   the	   MDLEA’s	   jurisdictional	   provisions	  
provide	   the	   framework	   for	   the	   United	   States	   to	   prosecute	   virtually	   any	  
trafficker	   found	   aboard	   any	   vessel	   engaged	   in	   illicit	   narcotics	   trafficking.48	  	  
Accordingly,	   the	   Coast	   Guard	   may:	   board	   any	   vessel	   of	   the	   United	   States	  
suspected	   of	   narcotics	   smuggling;49	   board	   any	   vessel	   suspected	   of	   narcotics	  
smuggling	   that	   is	   without	   nationality	   or	   is	   a	   vessel	   assimilated	   to	   without	  
nationality	  under	  international	  law;50	  enter	  the	  waters	  of	  a	  foreign	  nation	  and	  
board	   any	   foreign	   flagged	   vessel	   suspected	   of	   narcotics	   smuggling,	   with	   the	  
permission	   of	   the	   coastal	   or	   flag	   state	   in	   question;51	   and	   finally,	   board	   any	  
vessel	   that	   is	   suspected	   of	   drug	   smuggling	   located	   in	   the	   customs	   waters,	  
territorial	  sea,	  or	  contiguous	  zone	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  The	  MDLEA	  applies	  to	  
all	  of	  these	  vessels	  in	  all	  of	  these	  situations.52	  	  	  
	   As	   interpreted,	   however,	   the	   MDLEA’s	   reach	   may	   not	   be	   so	   broad.	  	  
Despite	  the	  MDLEA’s	  explicit	  extraterritorial	  application	  and	   its	  recognition	  of	  
the	   serious	   threat	   narcotics	   trafficking	   poses	   to	   the	  United	   States,	   there	   is	   a	  
circuit	   split	   on	   whether	   the	   United	   States	   must	   show	   a	   nexus	   between	   the	  
defendants	  and	  the	  United	  States	  for	  the	  MDLEA	  to	  reach	  their	  conduct.53	  	  	  
Additionally,	   in	   a	   recent	   opinion,	   the	   11th	   Circuit	   held	   that,	   because	   drug-­‐
trafficking	  is	  not	  a	  violation	  of	  customary	  international	  law,	  Congress	  does	  not	  
have	  power	  to	  proscribe	  illicit	  narcotics	  trafficking	  in	  foreign	  territorial	  waters,	  
                                                
47	  See	  United	  States	  v.	  Marino-­‐Garcia,	  679	  F.2d	  1373,	  1379	  (11th	  Cir.	  1982)	  (stating	  “The	  
legislative	  history	  of	  Section	  955a	  indicates,	  however,	  that	  Congress	  intended	  to	  extend	  
jurisdiction	  only	  to	  the	  ‘maximum	  ...	  permitted	  under	  international	  law.’”)(internal	  citations	  
omitted)	  
48	  Id.	  (citing	  125	  CONG.	  REC.	  H.	  6380	  (daily	  ed.	  July	  23,	  1979))	  (statement	  by	  Congressman	  
McCloskey)	  (Section	  955a	  “provides	  a	  sound	  basis	  for	  the	  prosecution	  of	  every	  person	  and	  
vessel	  ...	  engaged	  in	  international	  traffic	  in	  drugs	  and	  to	  the	  broadest	  extent	  possible	  under	  
international	  law).	  See,	  e.g.	  United	  States	  v.	  Del	  Sol,	  679	  F.2d	  216	  (11th	  Cir.)	  (former	  section	  
955a	  of	  Title	  21	  reaches	  prohibited	  acts	  aboard	  American	  ships	  on	  the	  high	  seas	  under	  “law	  of	  
the	  flag”	  theory);	  United	  States	  v.	  Romero-­‐Galue,	  757	  F.2d	  1147,	  1154	  (11th	  Cir.	  1985)	  (Section	  
955a	  reaches	  prohibited	  acts	  aboard	  foreign	  ships	  on	  the	  high	  seas	  with	  consent	  of	  the	  ship’s	  
flag	  state);	  United	  States	  v.	  Garate-­‐Vergara,	  942	  F.2d	  1543	  (11th	  Cir.	  1991)	  (section	  955a	  
reaches	  prohibited	  acts	  aboard	  vessels	  assimilated	  to	  without	  nationality	  status	  on	  the	  high	  
seas);	  United	  States	  v.	  Marino-­‐Garcia,	  679	  F.2d	  1373,	  1382	  (11th	  Cir.	  1982)	  (Section	  955a	  
reaches	  prohibited	  acts	  aboard	  stateless	  vessels).	  
49	  14	  U.S.C.A.	  §	  89(a)	  (2013).	  
50	  LOS,	  art	  92,	  110.	  	  
51	  See,	  e.g.,	  United	  States	  v.	  Carvajal,	  924	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  219,	  248	  (D.D.C.	  2013).	  
52	  46	  U.S.C.A.	  §	  70502(c)(1)(A)	  –	  (F)	  (2013).	  
53	  United	  States	  v.	  Estrada-­‐Obregon,	  270	  Fed.Appx.	  978	  (11th	  Cir.	  2008)	  (analyzing	  split	  of	  
authority	  on	  nexus	  requirement).	  See	  also	  United	  States	  v.	  Davis,	  905	  F.2d	  	  245,	  248-­‐49	  (9th	  
Cir.	  1990).	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where	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  the	  vessel	  was	  ever	  in	  international	  waters,	  under	  
the	  Offences	  Clause	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Constitution.54	  	  This	  holding,	  currently	  
limited	   to	   the	   11th	   Circuit,	   limits	   the	   extraterritorial	   reach	   of	   the	  MDLEA	   by	  
extending	  United	   States	   jurisdiction	   only	   to	   the	   territorial	   sea	   line	   of	   foreign	  
nations.	  	  Thus,	  in	  instances	  where	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  the	  suspect	  vessel	  was	  
ever	  in	  international	  waters,	  Coast	  Guard	  assets	  would	  still	  be	  able	  to	  enter	  the	  
territorial	   seas	  of	   foreign	  nations	   through	  bilateral	   agreements,	   as	  previously	  
described,	  but	  a	  nation	  other	  than	  the	  United	  States	  would	  ultimately	  have	  to	  
assert	  jurisdiction	  over	  any	  resulting	  narcotics	  interdictions.	  
IV. OTHER	  CONSIDERATIONS	  FOR	  THE	  UNITED	  STATES’	  INTERAGENCY	  
While	  the	  legal	  regime	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  cocaine	  threat	  in	  the	  maritime	  
domain	   is	   sound,	   there	   are	   some	   things	   policy	   makers	   might	   consider	   to	  
improve	  supply	  reduction	  efforts.	  	  We	  touch	  briefly	  on	  a	  few.	  	  	  
A. Support	  the	  Recapitalizing	  of	  Coast	  Guard	  Assets	  
	   There	   continues	   an	   obvious	   and	   well-­‐documented	   need	   for	   the	   Coast	  
Guard	   to	   continue	   its	   recapitalization	   efforts.55	   	  Without	   the	  hardware	   to	   do	  
the	   interdictions,	   the	   legal	   regime	   is	  only	  as	  good	  as	   the	  paper	  on	  which	   it	   is	  
written.	   	   The	   interdiction	   aspect	   of	   supply	   reduction	   requires	   assets:	   ships,	  
helicopters,	   law	   enforcement	   teams,	   and	   persistent	   surveillance.	   	   The	   DHS	  
layered	  strategy56	  requires	  long	  range	  patrols	  into	  the	  deep	  Caribbean	  Sea	  and	  
eastern	  Pacific	  Ocean.	   	  Coast	  Guard	  seizures	  of	  cocaine	  being	  transported	  via	  
maritime	  conveyance	  yields	  more	  gross	  tonnage	  in	  these	  patrol	  areas	  than	  the	  
cocaine	   seizures	   of	   all	   other	   Federal	   agencies	   combined.57	   	   In	   2012	   for	  
example,	   the	   Coast	   Guard	   seized	   more	   cocaine	   than	   all	   that	   seized	   by	   all	  
                                                
54	  United	  States	  v.	  Bellaizac–Hurtado,	  700	  F.3d	  1245,	  1249-­‐58	  (11th	  Cir.2012).	  
55	  See,	  e.g.,	  Antony	  Kimery,	  Without	  Adequate	  Recapitalization,	  USCG	  Faces	  Bleak	  Future,	  Panel	  
Hears,	  HS	  TODAY,	  Dec.	  12,	  2013,	  http://www.hstoday.us/industry-­‐news/general/single-­‐
article/without-­‐adequate-­‐recapitalization-­‐uscg-­‐faces-­‐bleak-­‐future-­‐panel-­‐
hears/99849ffb002290b2a82c404330f5fc50.html.	  
56	  See	  Phil	  Leggiere,	  Admiral	  Papp	  Outlines	  Layered	  Approach	  to	  Security,	  HS	  TODAY,	  June	  20,	  
2011,	  http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/daily-­‐news-­‐briefings/single-­‐article/admiral-­‐papp-­‐
outlines-­‐layered-­‐approach-­‐to-­‐security/ae69beb10ff8f66cdbb6b4635bb9160b.html.	  
57	  S.	  REP.	  NO.	  113-­‐77	  at	  76	  (2014),	  available	  at	  http://beta.congress.gov/113/crpt/srpt77/CRPT-­‐
113srpt77.pdf	  	  Cf.	  Dep’t	  of	  Homeland	  Sec.,	  Coast	  Guard	  Removal	  Statistics,	  (2014),	  available	  at	  
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/Drugs/stats.asp;	  Dep’t	  of	  Justice,	  National	  Drug	  Threat	  
Assessment	  Summary,	  8	  (2013),	  available	  at	  http://www.justice.gov/dea/resource-­‐center/DIR-­‐
017-­‐13%20NDTA%20Summary%20final.pdf;	  Dep’t	  of	  Justice,	  DEA	  Domestic	  Seizure	  Data,	  
available	  at	  http://www.justice.gov/dea/resource-­‐center/statistics.shtml#seizures.	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agencies	   in	   the	   continental	  United	  States	   combined.58	   	   Seizures	   closer	   to	   the	  
source	   countries	   of	   Colombia	   and	   Ecuador	   also	   yield	   higher	   purity	   cocaine59	  
and	   larger	   load	  sizes.60	   	  Failure	   to	   replace	  Coast	  Guard	  ships	  one	   for	  one	  will	  
surrender	  patrol	  areas	  previously	  patrolled	  by	  Coast	  Guard	  and	  Navy	  ships,	  the	  
latter	   carrying	   Coast	   Guard	   law	   enforcement	   detachments	   (LEDETs)	   trained	  
and	   ready	   to	   conduct	   law	  enforcement	  boardings.	   	   Indeed,	  due	   to	   the	   ships’	  
aging	   and	   increasing	   mechanical	   challenges,	   the	   United	   States	   has	   already	  
surrendered	  some	  of	  those	  areas.61	  	  Collapsing	  to	  the	  continental	  United	  States	  
amounts	  to	  a	  goal	  line	  defense,	  and	  forgoes	  the	  efficiencies	  of	  patrolling	  close	  
to	  the	  South	  American	  landmass.	  
B. Recognize	  Another	  Prominent	  Threat	  Stream	  
	   Cocaine	  is	  one	  threat	  stream	  in	  crowded	  field.	  	  Precursor	  chemicals	  used	  
to	  produce	  methamphetamines	  are	  gaining	   increasing	  prominence	   in	  nations	  
with	  only	  a	  fraction	  of	  the	  legitimate	  commercial	  need,	  spreading	  corruption	  in	  
its	  wake.62	  	  Massive	  shipments	  flow	  into	  Central	  and	  South	  America	  to	  facilitate	  
                                                
58	  See	  Admiral	  Robert	  J.	  Papp	  Jr.,	  Commandant,	  U.S.	  Coast	  Guard,	  Testimony	  before	  the	  United	  
States	  Senate,	  Committee	  on	  Commerce,	  Science,	  and	  Transportation,	  Subcommittee	  on	  
Oceans,	  Atmosphere,	  and	  Coast	  Guard	  (Apr.	  23,	  2013),	  available	  at	  
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-­‐113shrg85473/html/CHRG-­‐113shrg85473.htm.	  
59	  Id.	  
60	  See	  Written	  Statement	  of	  Rear	  Admiral	  Charles	  Michel,	  Dir.	  Joint	  Interagency	  Task	  Force-­‐
South,	  to	  the	  Subcommittee	  on	  Border	  and	  Maritime	  Security,	  House	  Committee	  on	  Homeland	  
Security	  (Jun.	  19,	  2012),	  available	  at	  
http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony-­‐Michel.pdf.	  Cocaine	  is	  
shipped	  from	  the	  South	  American	  landmass	  in	  larger	  loads	  before	  being	  broken	  down	  for	  
further	  transit	  north.	  This	  assertion	  further	  highlights	  the	  difficult	  problem	  set	  in	  interdicting	  
cocaine.	  	  Colombia	  produces	  95%	  of	  the	  cocaine	  seized	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Yet	  Peru	  has	  
surpassed	  Colombia	  in	  potential	  of	  pure	  cocaine	  production,	  350	  metric	  tons	  to	  270	  metric	  
tons,	  respectively.	  See	  also	  Rodney	  G.	  Benson,	  Assistant	  Admin’r,	  Chief	  of	  Intelligence,	  Drug	  
Enforcement	  Administration,	  Testimony	  before	  the	  Senate	  Caucus	  on	  International	  Drug	  
Control	  Statement	  for	  the	  Record	  (Oct.	  19,	  2011),	  available	  at	  
http://www.justice.gov/dea/pr/speeches-­‐testimony/2012-­‐2009/111019_testimony.pdf.	  Bolivia	  
too	  is	  a	  noted	  cocaine	  producing	  nation,	  capable	  of	  producing	  about	  195	  metric	  tons	  of	  pure	  
cocaine.	  	  Id.	  
61	  See	  General	  John	  F.	  Kelly,	  Commander,	  U.S.	  Southern	  Command,	  Testimony	  to	  U.S.	  Senate,	  
Armed	  Services	  Committee,	  (Mar.	  13,	  2014),	  available	  at	  
http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Pages/Budget-­‐shortfalls-­‐reversing-­‐SOUTHCOM-­‐gains,-­‐
commander-­‐says.aspx.	  
62	  See	  e.g.,	  Edward	  Fox,	  Guatemala	  Seized	  $6Mn	  of	  Meth	  Precursor	  Chemicals,	  INSIGHT	  CRIME,	  
Apr.	  2,	  2012	  (chemicals	  were	  being	  shipped	  to	  Honduras),	  http://www.insightcrime.org/news-­‐
briefs/guatemala-­‐seizes-­‐$6mn-­‐shipment-­‐of-­‐meth-­‐precursor-­‐chemicals;	  Veronica	  Prates,	  
Mexico	  Grabs	  Growing	  Role	  in	  Meth	  Market,	  INSIGHT	  CRIME,	  Aug.	  17,	  2011,	  
http://www.insightcrime.org/news-­‐briefs/mexico-­‐grabs-­‐growing-­‐role-­‐in-­‐meth-­‐market;	  Elyssa	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the	   production	   of	   amphetamine	   type	   substances	   (ATS),	   with	   precursor	  
chemical	   shipments	   flowing	   into	   countries	   that	   produce	   United	   States-­‐	   (and	  
transit	  nations)	  bound	  methamphetamine,	  and	  a	  still-­‐prominent	  cocaine	  flow.	  	  
The	  White	   House	   should	   convene	   a	   gathering	   of	   disparate	   law	   enforcement	  
stakeholders	  to	  establish	  a	  hemispheric	  strategy	  to	  holistically	  approach	  United	  
States	  supply	   reduction	   efforts.	   	   The	  current	  milieu	  of	   strategies	   is	  piecemeal	  
and	   congressionally	  mandated.	   	  Additionally,	   though	  a	  National	  Drug	  Control	  
Strategy	   exists,	  we	   submit	   the	   pendulum	  has	   swing	   too	   far	   towards	   demand	  
and	   treatment	   efforts,	   necessitating	   the	   need	   for	   increased	   supply	   reduction	  
focus.	  
C. Capture	  the	  Data	  
	   Nations	  must	   collaborate	   to	  quantify	   the	   cocaine	  &	  precursor	   chemical	  
threat.	   	   In	   order	   to	   assess	   the	   validity	   of	   policy	   decisions,	   rigor	   must	   be	  
established	   in	   measuring	   the	   international	   flow	   of	   precursor	   chemicals	   and	  
cocaine.	   	   The	   United	   States	   has	   a	   method	   of	   quantifying	   illicit	   threat	   flows	  
through	   management	   of	   the	   Consolidated	   Counterdrug	   Database	   (CCDB).63	  	  
Yet,	  the	  information	  therein	  is	  only	  as	  good	  as	  the	  data	  fed	  into	  it.	  	  Systematic	  
input	   from	   foreign	  nations	   similarly	  allied	   in	   reducing	   the	   illicit	  drug	   threat	   is	  
essential	  to	  understand	  the	  illicit	  drug	  flows	  as	  well.	  	  The	  rigorous	  inclusion	  of	  
worldwide	   seizure	  data	   coupled	  with	   local	  monitoring	  of	  prices	  and	  purity	  as	  
proxies	   for	   local	  supply	  and	  demand	  will	  provide	  decision-­‐makers	  with	  better	  
data	   upon	  which	   to	  make	   policies	   and	   assess	   progress⎯or	   the	   lack	   thereof.	  	  
This	   can	   only	   be	   done	   by	   engaging	   other	   nations	   for	   their	   information	   on	  
                                                                                                                             
Pachico,	  Investigations	  in	  El	  Salvador,	  Guatemala	  Reveal	  Thriving	  Trade	  in	  Precursor	  Chemicals,	  
INSIGHT	  CRIME	  June	  27,	  2012,	  http://www.insightcrime.org/news-­‐analysis/investigations-­‐in-­‐el-­‐
salvador-­‐guatemala-­‐reveal-­‐thriving-­‐trade-­‐in-­‐precursor-­‐chemicals;	  Natalie	  Southwick,	  What	  
Role	  do	  Mexico	  Cartels	  Play	  in	  Argentina	  Drug	  Violence?,	  INSIGHT	  CRIME,	  Nov.	  6,	  2013,	  
http://www.insightcrime.org/news-­‐analysis/rosarios-­‐rising-­‐violence-­‐and-­‐its-­‐roots-­‐in-­‐mexican-­‐
cartels;	  But	  see	  U.S.	  Dep’t	  of	  State	  Bureau	  of	  Int’l	  Narcotics	  and	  Law	  Enforcement	  Matters,	  
International	  Narcotics	  Control	  Strategy	  Report	  [hereafter	  INCSR],	  DEP’T	  OF	  STATE,	  Mar.	  1,	  2014	  
at	  1,	  available	  at	  	  http://photos.state.gov/libraries/argentina/8513/reports/INCSR2014.pdf	  
“The	  Argentine	  government	  neither	  encourages	  nor	  facilitates	  illicit	  production	  or	  distribution	  
of	  narcotics	  or	  laundering	  of	  proceeds.	  An	  independent	  judiciary	  and	  press	  pursue	  allegations	  
of	  corrupt	  practices	  involving	  government	  authorities.	  During	  2013,	  Argentine	  officials	  accused	  
several	  members	  of	  the	  security	  forces	  of	  involvement	  in	  trafficking.”	  	  Id.	  
63	  See,	  e.g.,	  U.S.	  GOV’T	  ACCOUNTABILITY	  OFFICE,	  GAO-­‐06-­‐0200,	  AGENCIES	  NEED	  TO	  PLAN	  FOR	  LIKELY	  
DECLINES	  IN	  DRUG	  INTERDICTION	  ASSETS,	  AND	  DEVELOP	  BETTER	  PERFORMANCE	  MEASURES	  FOR	  TRANSIT	  ZONE	  
OPERATIONS,	  (2005),	  available	  at	  http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06200.pdf.	  	  The	  CCDB	  is	  the	  
data	  storage	  that	  houses	  and	  “records	  drug	  trafficking	  events,	  including	  detections,	  seizures,	  
and	  disruptions.	  The	  database	  is	  vetted	  quarterly	  by	  members	  of	  the	  interagency	  counterdrug	  
community	  to	  minimize	  duplicate	  or	  questionable	  reported	  drug	  movements.”	  	  
2013]	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seizures	   to	  add	  to	  United	  States’	  data	  and	  corroborated	  reports	  of	  successful	  
illicit	  drug	  movements.	   	  This	  would	  necessarily	   require	  allowing	  access	   to	   the	  
data	  to	  foreign	  participating	  partners	  and	  information	  sharing	  agreements.	  
D. Judge	  and	  Witness	  Protection	  
	   The	  extent	  to	  which	  nations	  in	  Central	  America	  can	  ensure	  accountability	  
for	  criminal	  activity	  depends	  on	  the	   law	  enforcement	  and	   legal	   infrastructure	  
touched	  on	  already.	  	  Part	  of	  that	  legal	  infrastructure	  has	  to	  be	  security	  for	  the	  
judiciary,	  prosecutors,	  and	  witnesses.	   	  The	  smaller	  nations	  of	  Central	  America	  
have	   a	   formidable	   challenge	   to	   ensure	   the	   safety	   of	   its	   judges,	   lawyers,	   and	  
witnesses	   in	   criminal	   cases.	   	   Consideration	   should	   be	   given	   to	   empanelling	  
anonymous	  juries,64	  and	  United	  States	  assistance	  for	  robust	  witness	  and	  victim	  
protection	  programs.	  	  
E. Explore	  Expansion	  of	  the	  Joint	  Interagency	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Task	  Force	  Concept	  
	   Given	  the	  success	  of	   the	  Joint	   Interagency	  Task	  Force	  South	   (JIATF-­‐S),	  a	  
conversation	  must	  continue	  on	  those	  aspects	  that	  make	  JIATF-­‐S	  successful,	  and	  
a	   conscious	   discussion	   of	   application	   of	   those	   relevant	   elements	   to	   the	  
southwest	  border	  (SWB).65	  	  The	  SWB	  is	  a	  complex	  application	  of	  an	  analogous	  
set	   of	   variables.	   	  Mainly,	   JIATF-­‐S	   is	   successful	   because	  of	   the	   extra-­‐territorial	  
environment	   in	   which	   it	   performs	   its	   mission.66	   	   On	   the	   other	   hand	   the	  
southwest	   border	   is	   a	   complex	   amalgam	   of	   differing	   levels	   of	   domestic	  
government,	  overlaid	  with	  various	  law	  enforcement	  agencies’	  authorities,	  and	  
varying	   levels	   of	   border	   control,	   through	   which	   all	   sorts	   of	   threats	   present	  
themselves	   to	   our	   nation.	   	   That	   said,	   there	   are	   important	   extant	   capabilities	  
within	   the	   interagency,	   to	   include	   the	   International	   Organized	   Crime	  
Intelligence	  and	  Operations	  Center,	  the	  databases	  of	  the	  Organized	  Crime	  Drug	  
Enforcement	   Task	   Force	   (OCDETF)	   Fusion	   Center,	   and	   the	  Drug	   Enforcement	  
Administration	  Special	  Operations	  Division.	  	  	  	  
	   These	   organizations	   do	   admirable	   work	   sharing	   information,	  
deconflicting	   law	   enforcement	   operations,	   and	   producing	   leads	   for	  
                                                
64	  See,	  e.g.,	  United	  States	  v.	  Dinkens	  et	  al.	  __	  F.3d	  __,	  (4th	  Cir.	  2012);	  United	  States	  v.	  Ross,	  33	  
F.3d	  1507,	  1519	  (11th	  Cir.	  1994)	  (citing	  five	  factors	  to	  use	  in	  determining	  whether	  to	  empanel	  
an	  anonymous	  jury).	  
65	  One	  of	  the	  co-­‐authors	  has	  first-­‐hand	  knowledge	  due	  to	  heavy	  involvement	  in	  the	  effort	  to	  
examine	  the	  SWB	  for	  broader	  interagency	  collaboration.	  
66	  See,	  e.g.,	  CHRISTOPHER	  J.	  LAMB	  &	  EVAN	  MUSING,	  JOINT	  INTERAGENCY	  TASK	  FORCE-­‐SOUTH:	  THE	  BEST	  
KNOWN,	  LEAST	  UNDERSTOOD	  INTERAGENCY	  SUCCESS	  (Strategic	  Perspectives	  5)	  (2011).	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investigators	   and	   prosecutors	   working	   nationwide.	   	   However,	   there	   are	   a	  
number	   of	   lessons	   that	   may	   be	   brought	   to	   bear	   along	   the	   SWB	   to	   improve	  
interdictor	   and	   investigative	   successes,	   to	   include	  development	   and	  manning	  
of	   interagency	   entities	   focusing	   on	   the	   unique	   threats	   each	   SWB	   subregion	  
presents.	  	  	  Each	  prospective	  entity	  would	  need	  to	  identify	  an	  agency	  lead,	  gain	  
parent	  agency	  buy-­‐in,	  and	  time	  to	  mature	  organizationally,	  to	  realize	  their	  full	  
potential.	  	  	  This	  is	  a	  daunting	  challenge,	  but	  one	  worth	  addressing.	  	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
